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Meta-programming is an important programming technique, which is widely applied in logic pro­
gramming - cf. e.g. [1,2,3,4,5,6]. However, in spite of several studies - cf. e.g. [28,29,30] - the 
semantics of meta-programs and their formalization in logic remain open issues. Formalizations in 
classical logic, such as that subjacent to the Gödel language [31], are in the spirit of the classical 
formalization of first-order programs - cf. e.g. [8,9]. They interpret meta-predicates and predicate 
variables as higher-order symbols. How attractive they might be, the formalizations in classical 
logic are not conform to a programmer's intuition. Moreover, although such approaches rather con­
vincingly formalize constructs such as Prolog "call" and "clause" l they generally fail to account for 
constructs permitting a dynamic creation of predicate symbols and atoms, such as Prolog "univ" 
(=. . ) , "functor", and "arg" . The formalizations of meta-programming based on many-sorted logics, 
e.g. [10], are more intuitive. Nevertheless, they also fail to explain the dynamic creation of symbols. 
We argue that the inadequacy of classical logic to formalize meta-programming is related to 
the theory of types of this logic, i.e. to the principles that were introduced first by Russel in 
[ l l ] . 1 We argue that the standard models of meta-programs viewed as higher-order theories in 
classical logic are inadequate to describe the intended meaning of these programs. We propose two 
alternative approaches to formalizing meta-programs. The first approach, which we call "Russel-
Henkin semantics" keeps Russelian proof and types theories, but reconsider the model theory. The 
second approach, which we call "Frege-Henkin semantics" is more drastic: i t reconsider the proof 
theory by discarding any notion of "order" or type theory. 
The first approach consists in keeping a conventional proof theory and in reconsidering the model 
theory. More precisely, the conventional, Russelian theory of types is kept, but the models of higher-
order theories are redefined. Instead of standard models, we consider non-standard models of the 
kind introduced by Henkin in [16]. In such models, terms of higher orders do not range over all sets 
of individuals of lower orders, but only over certain sets, namely those sets that can be described 
as (or constructed from) formulas. We think that such a restriction of the interpretation of higher-
order terms reflects a programmer's intuition. We argue that the intended models of meta-programs 
are Henkin models, in the same way as the intended models of first-order programs are Herbrand 
models [9]. The Russel-Henkin semantics conveys, we think, the intuition of "amalgamation" [7] as 
well as of naming and ground representations [31]. We are not aware of any previous proposal to 
formalize the semantics of meta-programs in terms of non-standard, Henkin models. Defining the 
semantics of meta-programs in terms of Henkin models is, up to unsubstantial differences, similar 
1 Although programming language types are formalized in terms of logical theories of types - cf. [14] - the two 
notions are distinct. T h e " t y p e s " we refer to here are the " o r d e r s " of the hierarchical stratification of the universe of 
discourse into individuals , sets and relations of individuals, sets of sets, etc. 
to formalizing meta-programs in terms of many-sorted formalisms. Such approaches have been 
considered in [10,31]. 
The second approach, which we call "Frege-Henkin semantics" considers a proof theory with­
out any type theory, like Frege's Begriffsschrift [20,21,33] - a precursor of classical logic - and 
non-standard models ä la Henkin. Terms and individual are thus no more hierarchically stratified 
into successive "orders" or "types". This approach in fact re-formalizes HiLog [16]: types can 
be considered absent from HiLog because every symbols of this language belong to every types. 
Formalizing meta-programs as theories in a logic without theory of types means that no syntactical 
distinction is made e.g. between terms interpreted as individuals and terms interpreted as relations. 
The Frege-Henkin semantics gives rise to treating formulas as terms. Therefore, programming lan­
guages based on this semantics need a construct similar to Lisp "quote", an explicit quantification, 
or equivalently, a "ground representation" as proposed in [31]. 
A semantics of meta-programs without "orders" or "types" does not prevent to reintroduce 
types for other purposes. I f types are not necessary for formalizing meta-programs and meta-
programming techniques, they might well be desirable, for example for an easy application of these 
techniques. As a matter of fact, extensions of the type-free system HiLog with "programming 
language types" have been proposed [17,18]. 
Both, the Russel-Henkin and the Frege-Henkin semantics, are convenient to formalizing common 
meta-interpreters [3] and language constructs such as Prolog "call" and "clause". However, only 
the Frege-Henkin semantics fully accounts for the use of dynamic predicate symbol and formula 
constructors such as Prolog "univ" (=..)· The Russel-Henkin and Frege-Henkin semantics have 
one important property in common: According to both of them, the incompleteness results of 
higher order logic do not apply to meta-programs. In particular Gödel's incompleteness theorem 
for second-order logic and the undecidability of higher order unification [32] are not relevant to 
meta-programming - cf. [13]. This is conform to a widespread intuition. 
The correctness of the Frege-Henkin semantics needs to be discussed. The reason of the in­
troduction by Russel of his theory of types was indeed the inconsistency of Frege's Begriffsschrift 
resulting from its confusion of orders. Inconsistencies in Frege's logic are formulas affirming their 
own falsity, the "liar formulas". Such formulas are possible in this logic, because i t assumes no 
stratification of the universe of discourse. A logic with liar sentences is inconsistent, in the sense 
that such sentences cannot be consistently interpreted: assuming the truth of a liar formula per­
mits one to derive its falsity, and the other way around. Russel's stratification of the universe of 
discourse into types frees from liar formulas: such formulas are no more expressible. Liar sentences 
- or clauses that can be so qualified - are possible in HiLog. Due to the special acceptation of 
negation in logic programming, similar sentences are also possible in "unrestricted" logic programs 
(i.e. programs with no syntactical restrictions on the occurrences of negation in bodies of rules). 
The recent proposals of semantics for "unrestricted" logic programs - e.g. the Stable Model [22] and 
Well-Founded [23] semantics - can be seen as an alternative approach to that of Russel, for "dis­
abling" liar formulas. Instead of discarding uninterpretable formulas, as the theory of types does, 
these proposals ignore them. Interestingly enough, this is possible because of the "directionality" of 
logic program clauses. No similar approaches seem to apply to the richer system Begriffsschrift. I t 
is worth noting that primary attempts to formalize the semantics of logic programs with negation -
the stratification semantics [24], further studied in [25,26] and refined in several publications - were 
in the spirit of Russel's theory of types: stratification semantics impose syntactical restrictions for 
discarding undesirable formulas. 
We conclude that no type theory is, in our opinion, needed for formalizing meta-programs and 
term constructors. 
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